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Abstract
Recognise that people have many, possibly conflicting,
aspects to their personality. We hypothesise that each
separate characteristic of a personality may be treated
as an independent player in a non-zero sum many player
game. This idea is applied to the two person Prisoners’
Dilemma as an introductory example. We assume each
prisoner has a “mercenary” characteristic as well as an
“altruistic” characteristic, and find that all Nash equi-
libria of the Prisoners’ Dilemma has each prisoner in an
internal conflict between their two characteristics. The
hypothesis that people are composed of more than one
“player” may explain some of the anomalies that occur in
human experiments exploring game theory.
1 Introduction
In reviewing the implications of some psychological research in
game playing, Matthew Rabin comments
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humans differ from the way they are traditionally de-
scribed by economists . . . it is sometimes mislead-
ing to conceptualise people as attempting to maxi-
mize a coherent, stable and accurately perceived [util-
ity] U(x) . Rabin [4, p.12]
To include emotions into artificial intelligences, some computer
scientists explore the modelling of human emotions: Smith and
Ellworth, see [1, §8.2] for example, identified a six dimensional
“affective space” to capture 15 emotions.1 This suggests humans
are reasonably modelled by six “appraisal” dimensions. Crucially,
these appraisal dimensions are independent. Maybe humans play-
ing games, including the game called economics, act according to
the diverse needs of such internal characteristics of a complex per-
sonality; and not according to maximising a single well defined
utility.
2 The prisoners’ dilemma
As a first tentative exploration of the idea of multiple game play-
ers within one person, we explore two people, P and Q, playing
the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Suppose each person has an altruistic,
cooperative side and a mercenary, uncooperative side to their per-
sonality. These characteristics are not to be considered as oppo-
sites, but as independent characteristics, independent “players”,
1Smith and Ellworth’s axes for the six dimensional affective space are
called: pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, attentional activity, re-
sponsibility and control. The fifteen categorised emotions are: happiness,
sadness, anger, boredom, challenge, hope, fear, interest, contempt, disgust,
frustration, surprise, pride, shame and guilt.
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within each person. Perhaps view it as each person having two
independent dimensions to their character.2
Thus within person P we have two independent players, Pa
and Pm, the pair of altruistic and mercenary characters respec-
tively within person P. Similarly Qa and Qm are independent
characteristics of person Q. Be careful of the distinction between
people and players: each person is supposed to be a composite
of independent players. The two people then face a four-player
Prisoner’s Dilemma—two players per person. Each player has a
choice between the two strategies of cooperation C (remaining
silent) and defecting D (informing). We suppose, within any one
person, that if either of the internal players defect, whether the
mercenary or the altruistic, then the person does defect—a chain
is only as strong as its weakest link. That is, both aspects of a
person’s character have to cooperate in order for the person to
actually cooperate.
For simplicity we rate the outcomes on a four point scale of
preferences for each player. The preferences are not symmetric,
but we suppose symmetry between the pair of mercenary play-
ers and between the pair of altruistic players. We also assume
the preferences of a player only depend upon the other person’s
actual action: that is, whether they actually cooperate or de-
fect. Thus the preferences only depend upon the other person’s
players strategies in the combinations {CC} and {CD,DC,DD}.
We suppose the following preferences for the two types of player
within each person.
Mercenary. These players only care about the actual outcome
and thus the preferences depend upon his/her persons ac-
tual actions, that is, {CC} and {CD,DC,DD}. As in the
2Of course, we presume that a more realistic model of personality would
have more than two independent dimensions.
AJ Roberts, November 15, 2018
2 The prisoners’ dilemma 4
Table 1: payoff preferences for P-mercenary, P-altruistic, Q-
mercenary and Q-altruistic. The best response actions are in-
dicated in italic, and the four Nash equilibria in bold italics are
seen in the middle of the payoffs.
Qm = C Qm = D
Pm = C
Qa = C Qa = D
Pa = C 3 3 3 3 1 1 4 3
Pa = D 4 3 1 1 2 1 2 1
Qa = C Qa = D
1 1 4 4 1 1 4 3
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1
Pm = D
Pa = C 4 4 1 1 2 2 2 1
Pa = D 4 3 1 1 2 1 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1
classic prisoners dilemma the outcomes in increasing order
of preference are:
1. {CC} × {CD,DC,DD} when the person cooperates
but the other defects;
2. {CD,DC,DD} × {CD,DC,DD} when both people
defect;
3. {CC} × {CC} when both cooperate;
4. {CD,DC,DD} × {CC} when the person defects and
the other cooperates.
These mercenary preferences are shown in blue and magenta
in Table 1.
Altruistic. These players do care about the outcome as for the
mercenary characters, but if they, the altruistic player, de-
fects then guilt lowers their preference of the outcome. In
particular and for simplicity we suppose the preference is
decreased to the one lower. Thus for an altruistic player
the preferences in increasing order are:
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1. {CC,CD,DD}×{CD,DC,DD} when the person co-
operates but the other defects, or the altruistic player
defects and the other person defects;
2. {DC} × {CD,DC,DD} when both people defect but
only via the mercenary player;
3. {CC,CD,DD}×{CC} when both cooperate, or when
the altruistic player defects and the other person co-
operates;
4. {DC}×{CC} when only the mercenary player defects
and the other person cooperates.
These altruistic preferences are shown in red and green in
Table 1.
Inspect the consequent preferences shown in Table 1. The best
response [2, §2.8,e.g.] for each player as as function of the other
three players choices are shown in italic. A Nash equilibrium
corresponds to any cell with all four preferences being such a best
response. See the four Nash equilibria (in the middle of the table)
are obtained from the strategies:
{CDCD,CDDC,DCCD,DCDC} .
Remarkably, the four Nash equilibria correspond to both prison-
ers being in two minds about what action to take. Perhaps this
indicates something about the internal stress suffered by a per-
son in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The stress comes from the internal
conflict between the different characteristics within each person.
Since the four-player Prisoner’s Dilemma only involves pref-
erences the Nash equilibria are reasonably robust.3
3I have not searched for any mixed Nash equilibria.
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3 Discussion
Yet pure self-interest is far from a complete descrip-
tion of human motivation, and realism suggests that
economists should move away from the presumption
that people are solely self-interested.
Rabin [4, p.16]
Here we have discussed one model for how generalise the analysis
of human behaviour by positing a complex interplay of motivation
and reward internal to each person. This is a type of multiple-self
model of human behaviour.
The proposed model of people composed of multiple indepen-
dent selves also suggests a rationale for framing effects, described
as:
two logically equivalent (but not transparently equiv-
alent) statements of a problem lead decision makers
to choose different options. Rabin [4, p.36]
The many Nash equilibria that potentially exist in a game by peo-
ple with multiple selves make it quite likely that different state-
ments of a situation will lead to different Nash equilibria being
realised. Recall that the extensive form of a game often favours
one Nash equilibria over another [3, §6.2], even when the two Nash
equilibria are equally valid in the strategic form of the game; sub-
game perfect equilibria are the rational solutions in an extensive
game. Problem statements which present equivalent information
in a different sequential order lead to the playing of different ex-
tensive games even though the corresponding strategic games are
AJ Roberts, November 15, 2018
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equivalent. Thus the framing of a game problem possibly explores
independent players within a person.
A different multiple-self model has been proposed to explain
time varying preferences:
a person is modeled as a separate “agent” who chooses
her current behavior to maximize her current long-run
preferences, whereas each of her future selves, with her
own preferences, will choose her future behaviour to
maximize her preferences. Rabin [4, p.39]
The difference is that here we posited multiple selves to co-exist
simultaneously within each person. Such a multiple-self model
could explain the richness of human behaviour much better than
one simple utility.
Acknowledgements: I thank Daniel Burrell, Sam Farrell and
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